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Abstract 1 
In Forced Choice Tests (FCT), examinees are typically presented with questions with two equally plausible 2 
answer alternatives, of which only one is correct. The rationale underlying this test is that guilty examinees tend 3 
to avoid relevant crime information, producing a non-random response pattern. The validity of FCTs is reduced 4 
when examinees are informed about this underlying rationale, with coached guilty examinees refraining from 5 
avoiding the correct information, but trying to provide a random mix of correct and incorrect answers. To detect 6 
such intentional randomization a ‘runs’ test – looking at the distribution of the number of alternations between 7 
correct and incorrect answers – has been suggested, but with limited success. We designed a runs test based on 8 
distinguishing between patterns that look random andpatterns that are random. Specifically, we alternated the 9 
horizontal presentation (i.e. presentation left or right on the screen) of the correct answer alternative between 10 
each trial. As a consequence, guilty examinees were faced with having to chose to randomise either between 11 
correct and incorrect answers - leading to chance performance - or between answers presented on the left or 12 
right, producing a pattern that ‘looks’ random. As innocent examinees are unaware of the correct answers they 13 
can only randomise between horizontal positions. Results showed that the number of correct items selected 14 
distinguished guilty from innocent examinees only when they were not informed about the underlying rationale. 15 
In contrast, alternations between correct and incorrect answers did distinguish informed guilty from innocent 16 
examinees. Incremental validity of the alternations criterion and theoretical implications are discussed. 17 
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 1 
Resistance to Coaching in Forced Choice Testing 2 
Forced choice testing (FCT) has been used as a test to detect malingering of sensory 3 
impairment (Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975). More recently, it’s use has been extended to 4 
detect cases of faked memory loss (e.g., Denney, 1996; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989; Pankratz, 5 
1983; Van Oorsouw, & Merckelbach, 2010) and concealed information (e.g., Giger, Merten, 6 
Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010; Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007; Orthey, 7 
Vrij, Leal, & Blank, 2017; Shaw, Vrij, Mann, Leal & Hillman, 2012), from which guilty 8 
knowledge can be inferred. In the case of concealed information detection, a typical test 9 
works as follows:  A suspect is presented with a series of questions about the crime. With 10 
each question, two equally plausible answer alternatives are presented; a correct and an 11 
incorrect one. For example a question such as “What was the murder weapon” could be 12 
accompanied with two answer alternatives such as “gun” and “knife”. Suspects are instructed 13 
to select the correct answer, or guess if they don’t know. Innocent suspects – who have no 14 
knowledge of the correct answers – will have to guess on each trial, and thereby choose 15 
correct answer alternatives as predicted by chance. Guilty suspects, in contrast, know which 16 
of the two alternatives is correct. To conceal this guilty knowledge, they are inclined to 17 
purposefully select the incorrect answers, leading to underperformance, i.e., the frequency 18 
with which the correct option is chosen is below chance level. Consequently, hidden 19 
knowledge is inferred from underperformance. 20 
Previous studies have shown that FCTs have good detection rates for innocent 21 
examinees, specificity. However, the detection rate for guilty examinees, sensitivity, is 22 
modest at best. More specifically, with a specificity ranging around 95%, sensitivity ranges 23 
from 40% to 65% (Giger et al., 2010; Jelicic, Merckelbach, & van Bergen, 2004; Meijer et al., 24 
2007; Merckelbach, Hauer, & Rassin, 2002; Shaw et al., 2012). These validity estimates are, 25 
however, for participants who are unfamiliar with the test’s underlying rationale. Verschuere, 26 
Meijer, and Crombez (2008) showed that sensitivity is reduced considerably when 27 
participants have been informed about this rationale (i.e. coached). These authors coached 28 
half of their participants, and then submitted both naïve and coached participants to a forced 29 
choice performance test about autobiographical details. They were able to classify 58% of the 30 
naïve liars, but none of the coached liars when using underperformance (i.e., the number of 31 
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correct items selected) as the criterion. Consequently, the authors conclude that forced choice 1 
performance testing is not resistant to coaching. 2 
 The finding that coached participants beat the ‘correct total’ criterion (i.e. choosing the 3 
incorrect item more often than predicted by chance) fits with the strategy description provided 4 
by Orthey, Vrij, Leal, and Blank (2017). These authors proposed that test behaviour is 5 
governed by specific strategies, and that these strategies can be categorized into different 6 
levels in accordance with Cognitive Hierarchy Theory (CHT; Carmerer, Ho, & Chong 2004). 7 
In CHT, a strategy level indicates the degree to which it anticipates any opponent’s strategy. 8 
In terms of forced choice performance testing, the test is considered the opponent and the 9 
suspect the strategist. In particular, Orthey et al. (2017) specified three strategy levels. A 10 
guilty suspect who does not anticipate anything from the test and complies with the test 11 
instructions (‘Select the correct answer, if you don’t know, guess.’) carries out a level 0 12 
strategy. A guilty participant who assumes the test uses a level 0 strategy (i.e., compliance 13 
with test instructions) for detection therefore includes a reaction to this assumed detection 14 
strategy and executes a level 1 strategy. The most obvious reaction is to avoid correct 15 
information, which leads to underperformance typically seen in a substantial proportion of 16 
guilty participants. Finally, a participant who assumes the test uses a level 1 strategy (such as 17 
detection through underperformance) will use a level 2 strategy, i.e. attempt to calibrate 18 
performance within chance level. From this follows that underperformance as a detection 19 
criterion is only suitable for detecting participants who use a level 1 strategy. Coaching 20 
participants by warning them not to underperform, should elicit higher-level strategies, such 21 
as deliberate randomization.  22 
 All three strategy levels occur naturally in naïve guilty examinees. Orthey et al. (2017) 23 
found level 2 strategies to be the most prevalent and used by around 50% of their sample. 24 
This was followed by level 1 strategies, used by around 45%. Level 0 strategies were the least 25 
prevalent and occurred rarely (around 5%). Additionally, these authors linked the prevalence 26 
of strategy levels to the detection accuracy cap of the test. The total score criterion was apt at 27 
detecting underperformance in level 1 strategies, but was not designed to detect either level 0 28 
or level 2 strategies. This shows that the detection accuracy of the test is limited to the 29 
prevalence of detectable strategies and that detection accuracy can be increased by also 30 
detecting other strategies. 31 
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 Using a level 2 strategy means that examinees will attempt to produce a random 1 
sequences of correct and incorrect answers to pass the test. Yet, the correct total criterion is 2 
not the only criterion of randomness. Another criterion is the alternation rate. For example the 3 
sequence of CORRECT CORRECT CORRECT INCORRECT INCORRECT INCORRECT 4 
contains one alternation. The sequence of CORRECT INCORRECT CORRECT 5 
INCORRECT CORRECT INCORRECT contains 5 alternations. Innocent examinees 6 
alternate between correct and incorrect answers on subsequent trials at a rate of 50%. Yet it is 7 
not the case for guilty examinees. There is strong evidence suggesting that humans cannot 8 
properly reproduce randomness. When asked to generate a random response pattern, humans 9 
were found to utilize higher alternation rates than expected from true randomness (Nickerson, 10 
2002; Wagenaar, 1972). Multiple estimates suggest that human random responding features 11 
an alternation rate of 60% as opposed to randomness’s alternation rate of 50% (see Falk & 12 
Konold, 1997). In other words, an attempted random mixture of correct and incorrect answers 13 
can be expected to exhibit more alternations than a genuine random response pattern. 14 
 Indeed, the number of alternations between correct and incorrect has been used to 15 
detect coached participants, but with limited success. Verschuere et al. (2008) only identified 16 
21% coached liars. Similarly, Jelicic et al., (2004) – tested the number of alternations in those 17 
participants who indicated randomization as their strategy. In their sample not a single liar 18 
was identified using this test.  19 
 A potential reason for this poor detection accuracy might lie in that – as outline above 20 
– the difference between genuine randomness (50% alternation rate) and attempted random 21 
responding (around 60% alternation rate; see Falk & Konold, 1997), is relatively small. Such 22 
a small difference requires a large test-size (i.e., number of items or questions) to become 23 
significant, and test-sizes in Verschuere et al. (2008) and Jelicic et al. (2004) may simply have 24 
been too small to detect the difference between a deliberate and random mix of answer 25 
alternatives.  26 
In real life, including many items in forced choice performance deception detection 27 
tests may not always be feasible. The event may, for example not have enough details the 28 
investigators can verify and are exclusively known to the perpetrator (Podlesney, 1983). If 29 
constructing large tests is not possible, another way to enhance detection accuracy is needed.  30 
 In this experiment we attempted to increase the diagnostic accuracy of the FCT 31 
procedure without requiring additional questions. Traditionally, each question in a forced 32 
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choice test is presented with two answer alternatives. The position of the correct answer 1 
alternative (e.g., left or right) is determined randomly for each trial. In the current experiment, 2 
we alternate the position of the correct answer alternative between trials. On the first trial the 3 
horizontal position of the correct answer alternative would be determined randomly, for 4 
example on the right. On every subsequent trial the correct answer alternative would be 5 
presented on the opposite side of the previous trial. This way of presenting the answer 6 
alternatives allows for two types of randomized response patterns: Guilty examinees can 7 
randomize horizontally, alternating between left and right answer alternatives (which will 8 
look like a random response pattern), or between correct and incorrect answer alternatives 9 
(which produces a total score that falls within chance performance). In our design, 10 
correct/incorrect and horizontal alternations become negatively correlated. A high number of 11 
correct/incorrect alternations is associated with a low number of horizontal alternations and 12 
vice versa (e.g., always choosing the option presented on the left results in the maximum 13 
number of correct/incorrect alternations as well as the lowest number of horizontal 14 
alternations). Our idea behind this manipulation is as follows: innocent participants – whether 15 
naïve or coached – are unaware of which of the answer alternatives is correct, and will choose 16 
to randomize horizontally. As a consequence they will show a high number of horizontal 17 
alternations, corresponding to a low number of correct/incorrect alternations. Coached guilty 18 
participants are expected to employ level 2 strategies and are faced with having to choose 19 
between producing a sequence that looks ‘random’ (high frequency of horizontal alternations) 20 
or producing a sequence where the correct total criterion falls within chance levels. Being 21 
aware of the underlying rationale of FCT will likely result in a high number of 22 
correct/incorrect alternations. In naïve guilty examinees we expect all strategy levels to occur 23 
naturally with prevalences similar to Orthey et al. (2017), and that different criteria can detect 24 
different strategies. So the total score criterion will detect the examinees who employ level 1 25 
strategies, while the number of runs criterion will detect examinees who employ level 2 26 
strategies.  27 
Specifically, in the current study we investigated two questions: 28 
i) What is the effect of coaching on the strategies guilty and innocent participants 29 
select? 30 
ii) Can correct/incorrect alternations that are correlated with horizontal 31 
positioning discriminate guilty from innocent participants in cases of 32 
coaching? 33 
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Our hypotheses are as follows: we expect coached guilty participants to be more likely 1 
to use higher-level strategies than naïve guilty participants (Hypothesis 1), because coaching 2 
enhances their understanding of the test mechanisms and therefore aids strategy selection. 3 
Additionally, in line with previous research, we expect the correct total criterion to distinguish 4 
naïve guilty from innocent participants, but not coached guilty from innocent participants 5 
(Hypothesis 2). In contrast we expect alternations between correct/incorrect alternatives to 6 
distinguish coached guilty from innocent participants, and thus be resistant to coaching 7 
(Hypothesis 3). 8 
Method 9 
Participants 10 
A total of 104 students (78 female) were recruited from the first year population. Students 11 
were on average 20.32 (SD = 5.70) years old and received course credit as compensation. 12 
Data of one participant were excluded because he did not follow the instructions. Approval 13 
from the ethics committee was obtained. 14 
Procedure 15 
First, examinees were assigned to one of two Virtual Reality (VR) simulations in a 16 
counterbalanced fashion. Their purpose was to induce crime relevant information. Half of the 17 
examinees (N = 52) experienced an intelligence scenario, wherein the examinee represented 18 
an intelligence officer who had to search a terrorist’s apartment for clues about an imminent 19 
attack. The other half of the examinees (N = 52) experienced a real estate scenario, wherein 20 
the examinee took the role of a real estate agent who explored an apartment (different from 21 
the terrorist’s apartment). Both simulations featured an interactive 3D environment that was 22 
explored from the first person perspective. Additionally, only the intelligence scenario 23 
featured interactable objects that were marked by a salient exclamation mark. Upon 24 
interaction, a window appeared that displayed a detailed picture of that object and a short 25 
descriptive text, clarifying the pictures’ content. These objects served as the crime relevant 26 
information during the following FCT procedure. In case of the intelligence scenario the 27 
simulation terminated once all objects had been interacted with, or after three minutes in the 28 
real estate scenario. 29 
 After completing the scenario, examinees were informed that they were a suspect in a 30 
police investigation about a local terrorist and had to pass a lie detection procedure. The 31 
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examinees who had experienced the intelligence scenario (henceforward referred to as guilty 1 
examinees), were instructed to lie and to convince the police that they had never been in the 2 
terrorist’s apartment. Examinees who had experienced the real estate scenario (henceforward 3 
referred to as innocent examinees), were informed that they never had been to the terrorist’s 4 
apartment and that they were falsely accused. They were told that it was their task to convince 5 
the investigators that they had no knowledge of the terrorist apartment. Then examinees were 6 
randomly divided into a coached (N = 52) and naïve condition (N = 52), evenly split over the 7 
two VR scenarios. Coached examinees were provided with an advice from their attorney 8 
warning them about the mechanisms of the lie detection test (naïve examinees received no 9 
such information and directly moved on to the next part). Coached examinees received the 10 
following information:  11 
I know the lie detection test you will be forced to take. They will present you with questions 12 
about a crime that only the perpetrator knows the correct answer to. You will be asked to pick 13 
an answer alternative and they will instruct you to guess. They expect liars to deliberately 14 
pick the incorrect answers, to appear innocent. However, this is exactly how they identify 15 
liars. Innocent suspects are expected to actually score within levels of chance on the test. 16 
 Subsequently all examinees were subjected to exactly the same binary FCT. First, they 17 
were informed that they would receive a number of questions and two answer alternatives per 18 
question. (One answer alternative was always correct and encountered by guilty examinees in 19 
the intelligence scenario; the other was always incorrect and unfamiliar to both guilty and 20 
innocent examinees). examinees were forced to select one of the two answer alternatives for 21 
each question by clicking on them with the mouse and examinees were unaware of the total 22 
number of questions that would be asked. Answer alternatives were presented pictorially and 23 
their horizontal alignment (correct answer presented on the left/right side of the screen) was 24 
determined in the following way: On the first trial of the forced choice test the horizontal 25 
position of the correct answer was determined randomly. On the consecutive trials the correct 26 
answer would always be placed on the opposite side of the previous trial. This pattern was 27 
maintained for the entire test.  28 
 After completing the FCT all examinees were informed that the lie detection test was 29 
over and that they should answer the post-test questions honestly. First, they received two 30 
open questions, ‘What did you do to appear innocent during the lie detection test?’ and ‘What 31 
strategy did you have in mind to make the investigator believe that you were uninvolved with 32 
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the terrorist?’. Then guilty examinees received the questions and answer alternatives again 1 
and had to indicate the correct answer for each question, which referred to the actual stimulus 2 
encountered in the intelligence scenario. This served as a memory check. Guilty examinees 3 
remembered on average 95% of the correct answers (SD = 5.6; worst performance = 80%). 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
Forced Choice Test 8 
The FCT featured 20 different questions about the apartment encountered in the intelligence 9 
scenario. All answer alternatives were presented pictorially. The incorrect answer in each pair 10 
was taken from a third simulation and was therefore unbeknownst to every participant. A 11 
critical assumption of these pairs was that each option was equally plausible (Doob & 12 
Kirschenbaum, 1973) to prevent deviation from chance due to obvious/obscure answers. We 13 
used the innocent’s answers to check for biased items. Adhering to the rejection criteria used 14 
in Jelicic et al. (2004) and Merckelbach et al. (2002) all of our items were considered 15 
unbiased, because no answer alternative was chosen by more than 70% or less than 30% of 16 
the sample. Therefore, all questions were used for the analysis. 17 
Design and Measures 18 
This study featured a 2 (Veracity: guilty vs innocent) x 2 (Coaching: coached vs naïve) 19 
between-subjects design with ‘correct total’ (number of correct options chosen) and ‘number 20 
of runs’ (number of alternations between correct/incorrect options plus 1) as dependent 21 
measures. Both criteria were subjected to a z-transformation according to Siegel’s (1956) 22 
formula for binomial distributions. For the correct total criterion, z scores of 0 indicate chance 23 
performance, negative z scores indicate avoidance of correct information and positive z scores 24 
endorsement of correct information. For the number of runs the same applies in terms of 25 
number of alternations between correct and incorrect answer alternatives. 26 
Detection accuracy was measured in terms of sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity 27 
indicates the proportion of guilty participants correctly classified and specificity indicates the 28 
proportion of innocent participants correctly classified. Sensitivity and specificity are based 29 
on a specific cut off point. For the correct total the cut off was based on the theoretical binary 30 
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distribution as we expect innocent participants to inadvertently follow it. Sensitivity and 1 
specificity were computed for the conventionally used unidirectional 5% specificity cut off, as 2 
well as for 10% and 20% cut offs (e.g. Binder, Larrabee, & Millis, 2014; Van Impelen, 3 
Jelicic, Otgaar, & Merckelbach, 2017).  4 
Cut offs for the runs criterion were computed with sample parameters of innocent 5 
participants for both conditions. There were two reasons for this choice. First, guilty and 6 
innocent examinees were expected to deviate from the binary distribution due to our 7 
manipulation, which means a cut off based on the binary distribution would not appropriately 8 
reflect the differences between guilty and innocent examinees. Second, simulating innocent 9 
population parameters was impossible due to lack of population estimates. Consequently, we 10 
acknowledge that cut off specific detection accuracy for the runs criterion may be inflated as 11 
cut offs were derived from sample parameters as opposed to population parameters. We 12 
assessed sensitivity and specificity at the unidirectional 5%, 10%, and 20% cut offs. We 13 
choose for multiple cut offs for this criterion, because it measures a different psychological 14 
process (i.e. randomization) and therefore no optimal cut off is known yet. .  15 
Additionally, we computed the incremental validity of the runs criterion in a two-step 16 
classification procedure as in Meijer et al. (2007). First the sample was subjected to the 17 
correct total criterion to detect cases of underperformance using the traditional 5% cut off. 18 
Any examinees that passed the correct total criterion were then subjected to the runs criterion, 19 
with higher alternation rates than predicted by chance being indicative of deception. Accuracy 20 
was expressed as the combined sensitivity and combined specificity.  21 
Assessing the accuracy of such a two-step procedure is relevant, because level 2 22 
strategies occur naturally in naïve guilty. In fact, in Orthey et al. (2017) it was the most 23 
prevalent strategy, meaning that the runs-criterion could be relevant even for cases without 24 
coaching. Furthermore, as seen in Orthey et al. (2017) some examinees who employed level 2 25 
strategies still were detected using the total score criterion, likely because they incorrectly 26 
judged how many correct items were required for the test score to still fall within chance 27 
performance. Therefore, we must estimate how many cases of level 2 strategies still get 28 
detected by the total score criterion, as these cases would have been detected anyway. The 29 
remaining detection accuracy then indicates the incremental validity of detecting intentional 30 
randomization. As sensitivity and specificity correspond to a specific cut off point they do not 31 
generalize to other cut offs. Instead, the Area Under the Curve (AUC) can be used as an 32 
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indicator for detection accuracy independent of cut off points. It is based on the Receiver 1 
Operator Characteristic (Tanner & Swets, 1954; ROC), which plots sensitivity against 2 
specificity for the entire range of the continuous criterion. The AUC is the area covered by the 3 
ROC. It ranges between 0 to 1 with 0.5 indicating chance performance, and a higher number 4 
meaning better discrimination between guilty and innocent examinees. 5 
Participants answers to the open questions about their behaviour during the test were 6 
categorised into three strategy levels. Level 0 strategies represented compliance with the test 7 
instructions to select the correct answers alternatives. Participants who indicated that they 8 
selected answers they thought were correct or those who indicated to use no strategy were 9 
assigned to this level. Level 1 strategies represented a reaction to the test instructions. 10 
Participants who said they avoided correct answers on purpose or controlled their demeanour 11 
while selecting answers were assigned to this level. Level 2 represented patterns that 12 
purposefully included correct and incorrect answers. Participants who said they imitated 13 
responses patterns they believe people ignorant of the crime information would produce, or 14 
said they selected answers that seem obvious (either correct or incorrect), or indicated 15 
purposefully randomising between correct and incorrect answers were assigned to this level. 16 
Two blind and independent raters categorised the responses according to examples within 17 
each strategy level as specified in Orthey et al. (2017). Inter rater reliability was high (89% 18 
absolute agreement). Responses that did not fit any category were omitted from the analysis 19 
(1 participant). 20 
It is important to note that the strategy level measure indicates the intended behavior 21 
of the participant only. For guilty participants the strategy level is predictive of the total score 22 
(level 0 => overperformance, level 1 => underperformance, level 2 => chanceperformance). 23 
For innocent participants this is not the case, as by definition they were unaware of the correct 24 
answer alternatives and the alternatives were equally plausible. As their beliefs over which 25 
particular item was correct was unrelated to the true veracity of the test items, their strategy 26 
level should be unrelated to the total score criterion. Consequently, we can assume that 27 
manipulating examinees beliefs will only have behavioural consequences for guilty 28 
examinees. 29 
  30 
Results 31 
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Strategies 1 
TABLE 1 HERE 2 
First we examined the strategies examinees reported. We hypothesized that coaching would 3 
elicit higher level strategies in guilty examinees (Hypothesis 1). Table 1 depicts the 4 
frequencies of selected strategies divided by conditions. Innocent examinees reported using 5 
all types of strategies naturally, but when coached they seemed to endorse either answering 6 
honestly or randomising. Naïve guilty examinees also reported using all three strategy levels. 7 
Level 2 strategies were the most frequent, followed closely by level 1 strategies. Level 0 8 
strategies occurred rarely. When coached guilty examinees exclusively used level 2 strategies. 9 
 A chi-square test was performed and we found a relationship between coaching and 10 
the used strategy level for guilty examinees, Χ2 (2, N = 51) = 16.32, p < .001. Coached guilty 11 
examinees were more likely to exhibit a level 2 strategy than naïve guilty examinees. A closer 12 
look at the data revealed that the entire sample of coached guilty examinees used a level 2 13 
strategy, whereas the naïve guilty examinee sample consisted out a number of level 0, 1, and 14 
2 strategies (M = 1.44, SD = 0.65). This supports Hypothesis 1. 15 
 Additionally, we analyzed the detection accuracy of the correct total criterion per 16 
strategy level. Ninety percent of naïve guilty examinees, who used level 1 strategies were 17 
correctly identified, whereas 23.1% of naïve guilty examinees, who used level 2 strategies 18 
were correctly classified. All coached guilty examinees reported using level 2 strategies and 19 
only 8% of them were correctly classified. Together this supports the idea that the correct 20 
total criterion is apt at detecting level 1, but not level 2 strategies and that coaching facilitates 21 
the use of level 2 strategies. 22 
 23 
Detection Accuracy 24 
TABLE 2 HERE 25 
FIGURE 1 HERE 26 
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First we examined the correct total criterion. In the naïve condition a low correct total 1 
differentiated guilty from innocent examinees better than chance1, AUC = .69, p = .020, CI = 2 
[.53 .86]. In the coaching condition the correct total did not distinguish guilty from innocent 3 
examinees better than chance, AUC = .53, p = .742, CI = [.37 .69]. Similarly, when using the 4 
conventionally used unidirectional decision cut off of 5%, we found a 48% sensitivity and a 5 
92% specificity in naïve guilty examinees. Using a 10% cut off sensitivity rose to 56% while 6 
specificity remained the same at 92.3%. At the 20% cut off sensitivity was 64% with a 7 
specificity of 88.5%. When coached, the sensitivity dropped to 7.7% with a 100% specificity 8 
at the 5% cut off. At the 10% cut off sensitivity remained at 7.7%, but specificity declined to 9 
92.3%. At the 20% cut off sensitivity was 11.5% with a specificity of 88.5%. This suggested a 10 
sharp decline in detection accuracy for the correct total criterion in case of coaching, which 11 
supports Hypothesis 2. 12 
Next we examined the runs criterion. In the naïve condition, a high number of 13 
alternations resulted in worse general detection accuracy than chance1, AUC = .26, p = .008, 14 
CI = [.14 .43]. However, in the coaching condition the number of runs differentiated guilty 15 
from innocent examinees significantly better than chance performance, AUC = .69, p = .018, 16 
CI = [.55 .84]. We examined the detection accuracy for multiple suggested single cut offs and 17 
used the unidirectional cut offs of 5%, 10%, and 20%. In the naïve condition, the runs 18 
criterion featured a 0% sensitivity at the 5% cut off, which rose to 8% for the 10% and 20% 19 
cut off. Specificity was highest for the 5% and 10% cut offs with 92.31%. At the 20% cut off 20 
it declined to 80.71%. In the coaching condition, the 5% cut off featured a 7.69% sensitivity 21 
and 100% specificity. At the 10% cut off sensitivity increased to 34.62%, but specificity 22 
declined to 96.15%. At the 20% cut off sensitivity was 57.69% and specificity was at 69.23%. 23 
Thus, for both conditions the best sensitivity/specificity ratio was found at the 10% cut off. In 24 
any case the AUCs indicate that number of runs criterion was able to detect coached guilty 25 
examinees, supporting Hypothesis 3.  26 
Additionally, we expressed the difference between guilty and innocent examinees for 27 
the correct total and runs criterion in terms of their effect size Cohen’s d. However, this 28 
indicator was only computed for the coaching condition, as only in this condition the entire 29 
                                                          
1 Caution is warranted when interpreting these AUCs. The empirical ROCs are skewed (see Fig 1.), which is a 
consequence of the abnormal distribution of the criterion (due to different strategies used). The ROC implies 
that the correct total criterion is apt at detecting underperformance (level 1 strategy), but not other strategy 
levels. Similarly, the runs criterion performed worse than chance, because it detects over- not 
underperformance. 
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guilty sample utilized the same strategy level and was therefore assumed to be normally 1 
distributed. We found no effect for the correct total criterion (Cohen’s d = -0.02), as the 2 
coached guilty examinees (M = -0.38, SD = 1.26) matched the responses of coached innocent 3 
examinees (M = -0.36, SD = 0.99). The runs criterion had a medium effect (Cohen’s d = -4 
0.41), as coached guilty examinees (M = -0.05, SD = 1.18) favored alternating between 5 
correct and incorrect answer alternatives, but coached innocent examinees prioritized 6 
alternations between horizontal positions (M = -0.46, SD = 0.91).  7 
Incremental Validity 8 
TABLE 3 HERE 9 
 Finally we assessed the incremental validity of a two-step classification process. As 10 
step 1 we used the correct total criterion with the conventional unidirectional cut off at 11 
5%.That is, all participants whose correct total score fell within underperformance were 12 
classified as guilty. As the second step the remaining sample was subjected to the runs 13 
criterion using the three unidirectional cut offs 5%, 10%, and 20%. Accuracy was expressed 14 
as the combined detection accuracy of steps 1 and 2. See table 3 for corresponding 15 
sensitivities and specificities. The best ratio of sensitivity/specificity was found at the 10% cut 16 
off. In the naïve condition, we found a sensitivity of 56% and a specificity of 84.62%. In the 17 
coaching condition, sensitivity was at 42.31% with a specificity of 96.15%. Combined 18 
detection accuracies indicated that sensitivity and specificity of steps 1 and 2 were additive, 19 
suggesting a unique contribution from each criterion. 20 
Discussion 21 
 We coached half of our guilty and innocent examinees and then submitted them to a 22 
FCT. In an attempt to detect coached examinees we assessed the number of runs (alternations 23 
between correct and incorrect answers) in a modified FCT. We manipulated the horizontal 24 
presentation of correct answer alternatives to alternate between trials to create a dependency 25 
between horizontal (pattern that looks random) and correct switches (pattern that falls within 26 
chance performance). If one increases, the other has to decrease. We measured detection 27 
accuracy for the number of correct answer alternatives chosen and the number of runs as well 28 
as the strategies examinees reported they used to defeat the test. 29 
 Regarding the strategies examinees reported, frequencies of strategy levels in our 30 
naïve condition closely matched those reported in Orthey et al. (2017). Coaching increased 31 
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the reported strategy level for guilty examinees and coached guilty examinees exclusively 1 
reported using level 2 strategies. This is also reflected in the detection accuracy of the correct 2 
total criterion per strategy level. In naïve guilty examinees, the test detected level 1 strategies 3 
well, but not level 2 strategies. Similarly, detection accuracy for level 2 strategies in our 4 
coaching condition was very low. 5 
 The findings from this study support the idea that strategy selection is based on the 6 
beliefs one holds over the test mechanism and that strategies translate into actual test behavior 7 
(see Zvi, Nachson, & Elaad, 2012 and Zvi, Nachson, & Elaad, 2015 for similar findings a 8 
physiological concealed memory detection test). However, it is noteworthy that detection 9 
accuracies for level 2 strategies were not the same for both conditions. In our naïve condition 10 
- and in Orthey et al. (2017) - between 23 – 50% of guilty who used a level 2 strategy were 11 
still detected as opposed to 8% in cases of coaching. A likely explanation is already provided 12 
by Orthey et al. (2017). They reasoned that as strategy onset is currently unknown, naïve 13 
guilty examinees could have started to use a level 2 strategy too late into the test, making 14 
them therefore still detectable. In our coaching condition, this problem has probably not 15 
occurred, as participants were coached before they even started the test, which means that 16 
they could have started with their level 2 strategy at the very first question. 17 
 Detection accuracy in our naïve condition matched that of other experiments, as did 18 
the decline in detection accuracy in our coaching condition for the correct total criterion. As 19 
expected in our naïve condition we found a moderate sensitivity (48%) and good specificity 20 
(92%), which matched the range of previous experiments using naïve examinees (Giger et al., 21 
2010; Jelicic et al., 2004; Meijer et al., 2007; Merckelbach et al., 2002; Orthey et al., 2017; 22 
Shaw et al., 2012). In the presence of coaching sensitivity declined (8%), but specificity 23 
remained high (100%), matching the findings in Verschuere et al. (2008), reinforcing their 24 
conclusion that forced choice testing is not resistant to coaching when using correct total 25 
criterion.  26 
 The AUC of the runs criterion in the naïve condition suggests below chance accuracy 27 
levels. With a 10% cut off, this criterion featured a 8% sensitivity and a 92.31% specificity. 28 
This poor detection accuracy is likely a consequence of the underlying abnormal strategy 29 
level distribution. This criterion is geared towards detecting level 2 strategies, which made up 30 
only 40% of the naïve sample. Hence sensitivity is expected to be low. Furthermore, the poor 31 
AUC is explained by the substantial presence of level 1 strategies, because underperformance 32 
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is negatively related to the number of runs. Selecting only incorrect answers, also means not 1 
switching between correct and incorrect answers, which is what the runs criterion was 2 
intended to detect. Hence its’ detection accuracy is poor when alone applied to all strategy 3 
levels at once. 4 
 However, in contrast to Verschuere et al. (2008) and Jelicic et al. (2004), our runs 5 
criterion did differentiate between coached guilty and innocent examinees. We found a 6 
medium effect as guilty examinees provided responses with stronger tendencies to randomise 7 
between correct and incorrect answer alternatives, while innocent examinees were more 8 
inclined to randomise horizontally. This difference was best expressed at the 10% cut off 9 
point instead of the commonly used 5%.  10 
We acknowledge that single cut off accuracies may be inflated as the cut offs were 11 
computed with a sample instead of population parameters and therefore may be over fitted. 12 
However, the value of the runs criterion was clearly present in the AUC in a group 13 
exclusively reporting level 2 strategies. Thus, alternations between correct and incorrect 14 
answer alternatives can discriminate coached guilty from innocent examinees, even with 15 
small test-sizes as long as a response pattern can either look ‘random’ or fall within chance 16 
performance, but not both. 17 
 The combined detection accuracy of the two-step classification process with the 18 
correct total criterion and alternations criterion suggests that the effects of each criterion are 19 
additive. Thus, each criterion captured a unique subgroup of our guilty samples. The correct 20 
total criterion was sensitive to participants using level 1 strategies (e.g. avoiding correct 21 
information) and the runs criterion to those using level 2 strategies (mixture of correct and 22 
incorrect answers). Consequently, the runs criterion provides incremental validity to the FCT 23 
paradigm by detecting intentional randomisation either occurring naturally or as a 24 
consequence of coaching. 25 
The argument can be made that we coached examinees specifically regarding the 26 
correct total criterion, and that similarly coaching can be extended to incorporate the runs 27 
criterion as well. Nevertheless, our findings are still relevant for two reasons. First, as level 2 28 
strategies also occur in naïve examinees, the runs criterion can increase the detection accuracy 29 
in naïve examinees. Secondly, trying to apply countermeasures for multiple criteria at once is 30 
difficult and likely taxing on cognitive resources, thus reducing the likelihood to succeed.  31 
17 
 
As for methodology, we wish to address the common critique in deception research of 1 
virtual reality applications and mock crimes. Both are often considered a threat to ecological 2 
validity in deception detection. We argue that this is not the case here. The test itself was 3 
presented and conducted just as in reality. The virtual reality mock crime simulation only 4 
served to induce crime-related information in guilty examinees. This is necessary to ensure 5 
that the assumption is met that guilty examinees recognize the correct answer alternatives. 6 
The psychological construct researched in forced choice testing is how examinees decide to 7 
choose on each trial, not how they came to know the correct answer alternatives in each trial.  8 
Another potential concern is the validity of verbal self-reports as our measure for 9 
strategies. There has been considerable debate about the question how accurate self-reported 10 
measures are (Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977; Ericsson, & Simon, 1980; Schwarz, 1999). The 11 
concern is that human subjects may not be aware of the true reasons of their behavior and 12 
when asked about it can only produce a post hoc rationalization. To address this issue we 13 
specifically kept our questions focused on actual test behavior (i.e., ‘What did you do to 14 
defeat the test?’ instead of ‘What was your strategy to defeat the test?’). Therefore, the impact 15 
of measurement unreliability is kept to a minimum. 16 
In sum, we found further support for the idea that guilty examinee’s test behavior is 17 
governed by a strategy selection process based on their beliefs over the test’s mechanism. We 18 
conclude that the correct total criterion is vulnerable to coaching, but coached guilty 19 
examinees can be detected using our modified runs test.  20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 28 
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Table 1. Frequencies of strategy levels per condition 
   Truth tellers Liars 
   Naïve Coached Naïve Coached 
Level 0  8 15 2 - 
Level 1 12 1 10 - 
Level 2 5 10 13 26 
Other 1 - - - 
N 26 26 25 26 
 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
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Table 2. Detection accuracy for the alternations criterion 
 Sensitivity Specificity AUC p 95% CI 
 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20%    
Total test score criterion 
Naïve 48% 56% 64% 92.3% 92.3% 88.5% .69 .020 [.53 .86] 
Coached 7.7% 7.7% 11.5% 100% 92.3% 88.5% .53 .742 [.37 .69] 
Number of runs criterion 
Naïve 0% 8% 8% 92.31% 92.31% 80.71% .26 .008 [.14 .43] 
Coached 7.69% 34.62% 57.69% 100% 96.15% 69.23% .69 .018 [.55 .84] 
Notes. Sensitivity & specificity for number of runs criterion were based on the undirectional 5%, 10%, and 20% cut off points corresponding to the innocent samples.  
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Table 3. Detection accuracy of two step classification using total score criterion and the number of runs criterion. 
 Sensitivity Specificity 
 5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20% 
Naïve 48.00 56.00 56.00 84.62 84.62 73.08 
Coached 15.38 42.31 65.38 100 96.15 69.23 
Notes. Total score criterion (step 1) utilized unidirectional cut off of the binary distributions. The number of runs criterion (step 2) was based on the undirectional 5%, 10%, 
and 20% cut off points corresponding to the innocent samples.  
24 
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Figure 1 
Figure heading: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) for correct total and alternations criterion 
for naïve and coaching condition. 
 
Figure notes: Note that ROCs in the naïve condition were aberrant. This is likely a consequence of the 
abnormal distribution of strategy levels used in this condition. In the coaching condition all 
participants reported using the same strategy level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
